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AGENCY-INFANTS-INCAPACITY To APPOINT AN AGENT.-The plaintiff, an
infant, entrusted a stock certificate to the defendant subject to the plaintiff's
order. Without further instructions the defendant sold it. When informed
of the sale a few days later, the plaintiff accepted the defendant's note instead
of the proceeds of the sale. The defendant became bankrupt and the infant,
by her guardian ad litem, without a demand or notice of disaffirmance, sued the
innocent firms which had effected the sale, and the defendant for the conversion
of the certificate of stock Held, that the plaintiff could recover, the acts of an
agent appointed by an infant being void. Casey v. Kastel (I922, Sup. Ct) 195
N. Y. Supp. 848.
The instant Case applies the orthodox but superannuated rule. McDonald v.
City of Spring Valley (1918) 285 Ill. 52, 12o N. E. 476. But see Coursolle v.
Weyerhauser (1897) 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. 697; Benson v. Tucker (1912) 212
Mass. 6o, 98 N. E. 589; I Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) sec. 145; COMMENTS
(1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 201; COMMENT ON RECENT CASES (1914) 2
CALIF. L. REV. 311.
BILs AND No s-CERTiiOcAxN OF CHECK By TL M.RAm.In answer to the
plaintiff bank's inquiry concerning a check drawn by one X, the defendant bank
telegraphed that the check was good. The defendant refused payment, and the
plaintiff brought this action. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Flathead
State Bank v. First Nat. Bank (1922, C. C. A. 8th) 282 Fed. 398.
An acceptance or certification on a separate paper must unequivocally import
an absolute promise to pay. It has been uniformly held that the words "is good"
do not under these conditions amount to such a promise. Colcord v. Banco De
Tanaulipas (1918) 181 App. Div. 295, 168 N. Y. Supp. 710; First Nat. Bank v.
Commercal Savings Bank (igo6) 74 Kan. 6o6, 87 Pac. 746; Bank of Springfield
v. First Nat. Bank (888) 30 Mo. App. 271; L. R. A. i9i6C, I79, note.
CHAITIES-TaUSTS TO BRING ABOUT CHANGES IN EXISTING LAws.-The trust
in question was "to promote improvements in the structure and methods of govern-
ment, with a special reference to the initiative, referendum, and recall," etc; and
provided further "that the trustees should have full power .... generally to use
all lawful means to increase the knowledge of the citizens . . . . upon these
governmental and political questions .... to the end that popular democratic
and efficient government may be promoted in the United States of America."
Held, that if there is nothing inherently unlawful in the object to be attained or
means to be adopted, a trust for a public charity is not invalid merely because it
contemplates the procuring of changes in existing laws. Taylor v. Hoag (g2,
Pa.) 116 Atl. 826.
An early case, holding invalid a trust to secure the passage of laws granting
suffrage to women, and holding valid a trust to create public sentiment favorable
to the abolition of slavery, has caused great confusion in the law. Jackson v.
Phillips (1867, Mass.) 14 Allen, 539. The instant case, however, states accurately
the modern rule, and contains an excellent review of the authorities. Garrison v.
Little (1897) 75 Ill. App. 402; see contra, Bowditch v. Attorney General (1922,
Mass.) 134 N. E. 796 (approving Jackson v. Phillips in holding a trust to promote
"women's rights" invalid).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Fun oM OF SPEEcH-ADvcAcY OF OVERTHROW OF
GOVERNMENT BY FoRcE-The defendants organized and advanced the cause of the
Communist Labor Party which advocated the destruction of the United States
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Government by force. They were convicted of violating a statute which declared
it unlawful to advocate the overthrow of the existing government. Smith's Ill.
Rev. Sts. 1921, ch. 38, sec. 557-564. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the statute
was constitutional and that guilt, under its terms, did not require "a present and
imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated." People v. Lloyd (1922,
Ill.) 136 N. E. 505.
Here another statute limiting freedom of speech, passed under the influence of
"war psychology," has been sustained. The dissenting opinion considered the
statute unconstitutional, because, among other reasons, the constitutional guaranty
was surely intended to protect men in using revolutionary arguments, similar to
those made by Adams, Jefferson, and Lincoln. See Wigmore, Abrams v. U. S.:
Freedom of Speech, etc. (192o) 14 IL. L. REV. 539; Corwin, Freedom of Speech
and Press Under the First Amendinent (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 48;
COMMENTS (1920) 30 ibid. 68; (192o) 30 ibid. 861; COMMENTS (1922) 31 ibid.
422; COMMENTS (1922) 32 ibid. 178.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY OF TwmvE MEN.-The
defendant, indicted for a felony, consented to be tried by a jury of eleven men.
After conviction he appealed on the ground that he could not waive the right to a
trial by twelve jurors. Held, that the right could not be waived. State v. Sanders
(1922, Mo.) 243 S. W. 771.
The federal provision guaranteeing a trial by a jury of twelve in criminal
cases does not apply to the state courts. Thompson v. Utah (1898) 170 U. S. 343,
18 Sup. Ct. 620. Most state statutes are construed to mean that a defendant
indicted for a felony cannot waive a jury trial by twelve men. Harris v. People
(1889) 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563; State v. Mansfield (1867) 41 Mo. 470. A
contrary result is generally reached, however, in the case of misdemeanors.
People v. Fisher (1922, Ill.) 135 N. E. 751; State v. Wells (1904) 69 Kan. 792,
77 Pac. 547.
INSURANCE-INSURAB rE INTEREST IN LIn INSYRANcE.-The insured took out
a policy on his life naming as beneficiary the plaintiff, with whom he boarded, the
latter agreeing to pay the premiums. The agent had knowledge of all the facts.
A by-law of the company provided that no application would be accepted unless
the beneficiary was a relative or dependent of the insured. In an action on the
policy, the company pleaded a violation of this by-law. Held, that by accepting
premiums for four years, the by-law was waived, and further, that no insurable
interest was necessary. Howard v. Counnonweatlth Beneficial Ass'n. (1922,
N. J. L.) 118 Atl. 449.
New Jersey has stood practically alone in this country in holding an insurable
interest unnecessary in the absence of a statute to the contrary. Thomas v.
National Benefit Assn. (11ii, Sup. Ct.) 81 N. J. L. 349, 79 Atl. lO42; Trenton
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson (1854, Sup. Ct.) 24 N. J. L. 576. The instant case,
however, is the first decision to that effect in the highest court of that state. See
Vance, Cases on Insurance (19o4) 65, note 21.
JUDGMENTS-PARTNERSHIP---VALID AS TO PARTIES SERVED WITH PROCESS, THOUGH
ONE OF THEM IS NOT SERVED, AND JUDGMENT IS RENDERED AGAINST ALL.-The
defendant corporation sued two partners on a judgment previously obtained
against the firm. One partner had not been served with process in either action.
Execution was issued on the second judgment and levy made on the property of a
partner who had been served with process in the first action, but who was not a
party to the second. This partner and the plaintiff bank, which held a deed of trust
on the property, filed a bill to restrain the sheriff and the defendant corporation
from selling the property, on the ground that since the judgment was void as to the
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partner not served with process, it was void as to all the partners. Held, (one
judge dissenting) that the levy was good since the obligations of the partners
were joint and several, and therefore the judgments were valid as to those served
with process in both actions. Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey (1922, Miss.) 92 So.
840.
Many states have reached this result, either by statute or by judicial decision.
Martin v. Hawkins (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. g9i; Myers v. Shipley
(1922, Md.) 116 Atl. 645; Engstrand v. Kleff-man (igo2) 86 ivfnn. 403, 90 N. W.
1054. The authorities are in conflict, but the instant case states the more desirable
rule. See I Black, Judgments (1891) see. 211; cf. Livak v. Chicago, & E. Ry.
(1921) 299 IIl. 218, 226, 132 N. E. 524, 527.
PRocEss-AmENDmENT-Vom SummoNs NOT AmENDABLE.-The plaintiff mis-
takenly summoned the defendant to appear in the county court for an action which
was pending in the district court. The defendant made special appearance in the
district court objecting to its jursidiction for want of service of summons. The
plaintiff asked permission to amend. Held, that the summons was not amendable.
Land v. Christenson (1922, Neb.) i89 N. W. 838.
Since the summons named a court in which no action was pending against the
defendant, it was void and therefore not amendable because there was nothing to
amend. Osbortt v. McCloskey (1878, N. Y.) 55 How. Prac. 345; Roy v. Phelps
(91) 83 Vt. 174, 75 At. 13.
PROPERTY-COVENANT AGAINST ENCUMIBRANCES.-The defendant's deed con-
tained a covenant warranting the land free from all encumbrances. The grantee,
discovering that a drain built by contiguous property owners ran through this
land, sued on the covenant. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Carver v.
Lane (1922, Minn.) 19o N. W. 68.
An encumbrance is, as a general rule, any right or interest in land which exists
in third persons to the diminution of its value. Sinons v. Diawnd Match Co.
(909) 159 Mich. 241, 123 N. W. 1132; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o)
sec. 452. The instant case is of the minority, refusing to consider such a right an
encumbrance if it confers any benefit to the owner of the land. Stuhr v. Butter-
field (ig1) 15i Iowa, 736, 13o N. W. 897; 36,L. R. A. (N. S.) 321, note; but
see Schwartz v. Black (ii5) 131 Tenn. 360, 174 S. W. 1146; NOTES (1915) 15
COL. L. Rav. 626; Eriksen v. Whitescarver (1914) 57 Colo. 409, 142 Pac. 413;
Smith v. Sprague (1867) 40 Vt. 43.
SUBROGATION-MONEY MISAPPROPRIATED AND USED TO MAKE UP ADMINISTRA-
TOR'S SHORTAGE.-The treasurer of the plaintiff taxing district wrongfully appro-
priated funds of the district to make good his defalcations as administrator of a
certain estate, which defalcations would otherwise have been made good by the
defendant surety on the administrator's bond. The taxing district brought suit
against the surety company for equitable relief by way of subrogation to the
rights of the estate. Held, that the surety was liable. First Taxing District v.
Gregory (1922, Conn.) ii8 AtI. 96.
Equity frequently grants relief by way of subrogation where money is fraudu-
lently appropriated for the payment of a debt. Pittsburg-Westmoreland Coal Co.
v. Kerr (1917) 220 N. Y. 137, 115 N. E. 465; Newell v. Hadley (191o) 2o6 Mass.
335, 92 N. E. 507. For an application of the principles of subrogation to surety-
ship transactions, see (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAI, 706.
ToRTS-LimAHITY oF MANUFACTURER OF BoTTax BEvERAGE.-The plaintiff pur-
chased from a retail confectioner a bottle of soda water. Due to the presence
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of some small particles of ground glass therein, he was seriously injured and
sued the manufacturer for damages. Held, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applied and that the plaintiff could recover. Goldman and Freiman Bottling
Co. v. Sindell (1922, Md.) 117 Atl. 866.
There is a tendency in cases of this type to extend the right of action beyond
the immediate purchaser to any person "who might reasonably be expected to
suffer injury." Heineman v. Barfield (1918) 136 Ark. 500, 207 S. W. 58;
Mazetti v. Armour (1913) 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633. The law on the subject,
howeyer, is still somewhat chaotic on the question whether the action is one of
implied warranty or negligence or both. The real basis of recovery seems to lie
in the necessary public policy of demanding the highest degree of care from
manufacturers of prepared foods. For further discussion, see COMMENTS (1920)
29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 782; (1918) 27 ibid. io68.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-ATTRACTIVE NuIsANCE.-The electric wires of the defen-
dant railway company were strung over the top of a bridge thirty feet above the
roadway. Small boys sometimes climbed up on the bridge, but were frequently
chased off by policemen and railway guards. The plaintiff, a boy eight years old,
,climbed up on the bridge after a bird's nest, knowing at the time that he was not
allowed to do so. -While there he touched the electric wire and received the
injuries for which this action was brought. Held, that the plaintiff could not
recover since there was no basis for an inference of either an invitation or a
license. N. Y., N. H. and H. Ry. v. Fructer (1922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct -.
This decision was not unexpected. See (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 200.
For a criticism of the result reached in the Circuit Court of Appeals, see (1921)
30 ibid. 870.
VERDICTS-RECOMMENDATION BY JURY TO DONATE THE AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT
TO CHARITY.-The plaintiff brought an action to recover secret profits made by
the defendants who as agents purchased land for the plaintiff. There was a
verdict for the plaintiff in the lower court, the jury recommending that the
recovery be donated to the American Red Cross. The defendant appealed on
the ground that the recommendation vitiated the verdict. Held, that the verdict
would stand. Robyn v. White (1922, Minn.) 189 N. W. 577.
The instant decision is analogous to those cases where a recommendation of
clemency is held not to vitiate the verdict, and is an interesting and rather
unusual application of the rule that the portion of a verdict lying outside the
legitimate province of the jury may be rejected as surplusage. See Common-
wealth v. Zec (1918) 262 Pa. 251, 105 AtI. 279; Robertson & Wilson Scale &
Supply Co. z. Richman (1920) :212 Mich. 334, i8o N. W. 470; Smith v. Means
(1913) 170 Mo. App. 158, 155 S. W. 454.
WILLs-NuNcUPATIVE WILLS-WITNESSES MUST UNDERSTAND LANGUAGE IN
WHICH WILL is DICTATED.-The testatrix dictated her nuncupative will in
French. One of the witnesses translated her words into English. The notary
took down the translation and read it in English to the testatrix, who understood
and spoke English imperfectly. Only one of the three witnesses understood
French. Held, that the witnesses to a nuncupative will must understand the
language 'in which it is dictated. Lataprie v. Bandot (1922, La.) 92 So. 776.
Nuncupative wills, where they still exist, are subject to strict statutory require-
ments and limitations. See Rood, Wills (19o4) sec. 219 et seq. The modem
tendency is to invalidate them altogether, except as to soldiers and sailors.
I Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators (5th ed. 1915) sec. 365. The
instant case seems correct.
